


Distributed Representations of Words


I cnduo't byleiee taht I culod aulaclty uesdtannrd waht I was rdnaieg. Unisg the icndeblire pweor of the hmuan mnid, accdcrnig to rseecrah at Cmabrigde Uinervtisy, it dseno't mttaer in waht oderr the lterets in a wrod are, the olny irpoamtnt tihng is taht the frsit and lsat ltteer be in the rhgit pelae. The rset can be a taotl mses and you can sitll raed it whoutit a pboerlm. Tihs is bucseae the huamn mnid deos not raed ervey ltteer by istlef, but the wrod as a wlohe. Aaznmig, huh? Yaeh and I awlyas tghhuot slelinpg was ipmorantt! See if yuor fdreins can raed tihs too.

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Language and Thought Connectionist View of Language Language is another set of input-output mappings (e.g., orthography to phonology, orthography to semantics) Socrates (d. 399 BCE): "that which we know we must surely be able to tell" (Plato, Laches 190c) These mappings are trained up using the same learning algorithms used elsewhere (e.g., vision) Socrates on definition: The same pathways handle both rules and exceptions ... what is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? (*Laches* 191e) Hard to tell what is "regular" vs "exceptional" Well then, show me what, precisely, this ideal is, so that, with my regular: clown, down eye on it, and using it as a standard, I can say that any action done by you or anybody else is holy if it resembles this ideal, or, if it exception: blown... but blown goes with grown Distributed lexicon: Knowledge about words is embodied in does not, can deny that it is holy. (Euthyphro 6e) reciprocal mappings between phonology, orthography, semantics – there is no central "word representation" And so of the virtues, however many and different they maybe, they all have a common nature which makes them virtues. (Meno 72) 4/18/17 COSC 494/594 CCN COSC 494/594 CCN (slide < Frank)



• A syllogism:

All M are P

S is M

 $\therefore S$ is P

Common Features of Calculi

- Information (data) representation is:
 - formal (info. represented by arrangements)
 - finite (finite arrangements of atomic tokens)
 - definite (can determine symbols & syntax)
- Information processing (rule following) is:
 - formal (depends on arrangement, not meaning)
 - finite (finite number of rules & processing time)
 - definite (know which rules are applicable)

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Thought as Calculation

- "By ratiocination I mean computation." — Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
- "Then, in case of a difference of opinion, no discussion ... will be any longer necessary ... It will rather be enough for them to take pen in hand, set themselves to the abacus, and ... say to one another, "Let us calculate!" - Leibniz (1646-1716)
- Boole (1815–64): his goal was "to investigate the fundamental laws of those operations of mind by which reasoning is performed; to give expression to them in the symbolical language of a Calculus"

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Early Investigations in Mechanized Thought

- Leibniz (1646–1716): mechanical calculation & formal inference
- Boole (1815–1864): "laws of thought"
- Jevons (1835–1882): logical abacus & logical piano 🖙
- von Neumann (1903–1957): computation & the brain
- Turing (1912-1954): neural nets, artificial intelligence, "Turing test" 4/18/17
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Symbolic AI & Cognitive Science Western philosophy has generally assumed knowledge and cognition can be described in terms of language-like structures (a *language of thought*) Symbolic AI and CogSci assumed intelligence resides in: the structures of a knowledge representation language deduction-like formal rules for their manipulation Knowledge represented at a symbolic level:

- atomic word-level categories
- related by sentence-like logical structures
- Semantics is reduced to syntax
- that is meaning is represented and manipulated formally (calculation)
- The brain doesn't matter because all computers are equally powerful competence is relevant, but not performance
- Is a language of thought "the only game in town"?
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
Connectionist AI & Cognitive Science


- Knowledge is represented at a subsymbolic level:
- in terms of minute, quantitative features
- related by low-level, often statistical connections grounded in sensorimotor interactions
- Knowledge is more akin to an image than a sentence
- The brain is very relevant because:
- it shows us how to do connectionist information processing
- it places tight constraints on models, because brains have to work in real time: performance is critical (100 step rule etc.)
- on the other hand, e.g., symbolic approaches try to account for unlimited nesting, connectionist don't need to COSC 494/594 CCN

Some Questions...


- What general processes are involved in reading, and how do these sometimes fail (e.g., in dyslexia)?
- How are we able to read "cat," "yacht," and "nust"?
- Why do children say "I goed to school" when previously they said "I went"?
- How do words come to mean anything?
- How do we go beyond words to sentences?


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































































- Regularities in pronunciation are often partial, context dependent: bint
- i in mint, hint, stint,... (regular) vs. pint (exception)
- but also: mind, find, hind,... (regular) mine, fine, dine,... (regular)
- Pronunciation depends on context
- Exceptions are extremes of context dependence
- Need a range of context dependency for regulars and exceptions.


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












































































Rohde (2002) Model

- Uses structured semantic representations in form of slot-filler propositions
- Includes roles: agent, experiencer, goal, instrument, patient, source, theme, beneficiary, companion, location, author, possession, subtype, property, if, because, while, and although
- Departs from notion of unstructured gestalt representation of semantic meaning
- Injects externally more of what model should be developing on own
- Challenge: develop a more naturalistic way of training corresponding semantics


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An Inverted View

- <u>Pragmatics</u> emerges through statistical regularities in our interactions with the world, including other humans
- <u>Semantics</u> (meaning) emerges through statistical regularities in pragmatic interactions (including communication)
- <u>Syntax</u> emerges through statistical regularities in the communication of semantics

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