Ethology
studies animal behavior, and neuroethology studies the neural
structures subserving animal behavior. Evolutionary
neuroethology, then, studies the evolution of these neural
structures. This discipline may seem remote indeed from
Neoplatonism, but I will argue for its relevance.
We begin with the observation that there are perceptual and behavioral structures characteristic of each species; these dynamical structures are commonly called instincts. Further, these innate structures are coupled to the species’ environment of evolutionary adaptedness; this is the term evolutionary biologists use to refer to the environment in which the species has evolved and to which it has become adapted through natural selection. These innate perceptual-behavioral structures are common to all members of the species and change very slowly (at evolutionary timescales).
As a species, Homo sapiens also has innate perceptual-behavioral structures, although there is scientific disagreement about what, specifically, they are. It is fundamentally an empirical question, although often distorted by ideology. For my argument, all that is essential is that we grant that such structures exist.
The
instincts define a life-cycle pattern for each member of the species,
which unfolds through the developmental program encoded in the
genome. That is, the phylogenetic pattern, encoded in the genome, is expressed ontogenetically
by the individual’s development in, and interaction with, its
environment. A particular organism’s environment may differ
from its species’ environment of evolutionary adaptedness, which
is especially the case with modern humans.
The instinctual patterns of behavior are potentiated at various times in an organism’s life, but are activated by an innate releasing mechanism when the corresponding releaser or sign stimulus is present. For example, in many animals mating behavior is potentiated at sexual maturity, but activated by a releaser such as an estrus-related pheromone.
As a species, Homo sapiens also has innate perceptual-behavioral structures, although there is scientific disagreement about what, specifically, they are. It is fundamentally an empirical question, although often distorted by ideology. For my argument, all that is essential is that we grant that such structures exist.
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