G-commerce: Market Formulations Controlling Resource Allocation on the Computational Grid

Rich Wolski, James S. Plank, John Brevik and Todd Bryan

Technical Report UT-CS-00-450, University of Tennessee, October, 2000.

This paper was been submitted to IPDPS-01, and was accepted. Here is a link to that paper, which is a much shortened version of this paper.

Also, for further work in this area, see the journal version of the paper, in The International Journal of High Performance Computing Applications.

Available from CS-00-450.ps.gz as gzipped postscript and CS-00-450.pdf as PDF.


In this paper, we investigate G-commerce --- computational economies for controlling resource allocation in Computational Grid settings. We define hypothetical resource consumers (representing users and Grid-aware applications) and resource producers (representing resource owners who ``sell'' their resources to the Grid). We then measure the efficiency of resource allocation under two different market conditions: commodities markets and auctions. We compare both market strategies in terms of price stability, market equilibrium, consumer efficiency, and producer efficiency. Our results indicate that commodities markets are a better choice for controlling Grid resources than previously defined auction strategies.

gzipped postscript of the paper

PDF of the paper

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