G-commerce: Market Formulations Controlling Resource Allocation on the Computational Grid

Rich Wolski, James S. Plank, John Brevik and Todd Bryan

International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS), San Francisco, CA, April, 2001.

Available via anonymous ftp to cs.utk.edu in pub/plank/papers/IPDPS-01.pdf and pub/plank/papers/IPDPS-01.ps.Z.

The final published version is an extreme shortening of the original submission. To get the full information that was in the submission, see either Technical Report 450, with the same title, or the journal version of the paper, in The International Journal of High Performance Computing Applications.


In this paper, we investigate G-commerce --- computational economies for controlling resource allocation in Computational Grid settings. We define hypothetical resource consumers (representing users and Grid-aware applications) and resource producers (representing resource owners who ``sell'' their resources to the Grid). We then measure the efficiency of resource allocation under two different market conditions: commodities markets and auctions. We compare both market strategies in terms of price stability, market equilibrium, consumer efficiency, and producer efficiency. Our results indicate that commodities markets are a better choice for controlling Grid resources than previously defined auction strategies.

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